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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JAMES FLOYD WORKMAN, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. Case No. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State 10615 
Prison, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, James Floyd Workman, appeals 
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court 
denying his release on petition of writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On December 8, 1965, James Floyd Workman 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the dis-
trict court for Salt Lake County attacking his con-
viction for the crime of second degree burglary. An 
amended petition for writ of habeas corpus was 
filed on the 14th day of February, 1966. An answer 
to the amended petition was filed by the State on 
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the 17th day of February, 1966, and on March 16 
1966, the matter came on for hearing before th~ 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge, who dismissed the 
petition, finding it without merit. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the decision of the trial 
court denying relief by habeas corpus should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of 
facts: The appellant filed a petition and an amended 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging, (1) that 
appellant had been deprived of counsel at every 
stage of the proceedings that resulted in his present 
commitment, (2) that the appellant had not been ad-
vised of his rights at the time of his arrest, and, (3) 
that at the time the appellant entered a plea of guilty, 
the district court failed to advise appellant of the 
possible incarceration that could result from such a 
plea (R. 1 &9). An answer to the amended petition 
was filed admitting that petitioner was not advised 
as to the possibility of incarceration at the time the 
plea of guilty was entered, but alleging that such 
a failure to advise appellant was not a basis for writ 
of habeas corpus (R. 8). 
At the time of hearing, appellant was the only 
witness to testify in his behalf. Appellant's testimony 
may be summarized as follows: that the arresting 
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officers advised appellant to waive preliminary 
hearing (R. 29); that when appellant appeared be-
fore the Provo City Court, the complaint was read 
to appellant (R. 30), but nothing was said to appel-
lant concerning his right to counsel (R. 31); that the 
transcript of the hearing which took place in th13 
district court (Exhibit P-1) was incorrect in stating 
that the appellant answered "no" to an inquiry by 
the court as to whether appellant had or desired 
counsel (R. 32). On cross-examination, appellant testi-
fied to serving a prior term in the Utah State Peni-
tentiary for the crime of second degree burglary 
and that such term commenced around 1956 (R. 34). 
Appellant further testified that the arresting officers 
did not threaten or intimidate appellant in any way 
if he refused to waive preliminary hearing (R. 36), 
and that the appellant was aware of the penalty fo:-
the crime of second degree burglary (R. 40), and the 
likelihood that the appellant would be returned to 
the Utah State Prison (R. 41). 
The State relied on the testimony of three wit-
nesses to establish, (1) the standard practice of Judge 
Meservy, of the Provo City Court at the time of ap-
pellant's appearance (R. 47), that the appellant was 
advised in the city court proceedings of his right to 
counsel (R. 57), that after appellant's arrest, appellant 
voluntarily gave a statement implicating himself as 
to the charges against him (R. 50), that the purpose 
of the introduction of this statement was to illustrate 
apoellant's behavior and conduct as indicating a 
likelihood of a waiver of the formal judicial matters 
m. 50), and that while the appellant was being es-
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carted to the Provo City Court, appellant was again 
advised that the court would appoint counsel (R. 62). 
While the appellant's brief is not clear as to the 
grounds relied on for reversal, respondent submits 
that the issues involved in this appeal are: (1) wheth-
er appellant effectively waived his right to counsel, 
(2) whether appellant was not advised as to his rights 
at the time of his arrest and also whether such advice 
is necessary at the time of his arrest, (3) whether the 
failure of the court to advise appellant of the pos-
sible incarceration that could result from a plea of 
guilty resulted in prejudicial error to the appellant, 
or whether this contention affords a proper basis for 
habeas corpus proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY, INTELLI-
GENTLY, AND UNDERSTANDINGLY WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL THROUGH ALL STAGES OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS THAT RESULTED IN APPELLANT'S 
COMMITMENT. 
A primary consideration is the standard applica-
ble to a finding that the appellant effectively waived 
his right to counsel throughout the proceedings that 
resulted in appellant's commitment. It has been sug-
gested that the federal requirements as to an effec-
tive waiver of counsel are applicable to state actions. 
Mazor, The Right to Be Provided Counsel: Variations 
on a Familiar Theme, 9 Utah L. Rev. 50, 75 (1964). 
Also, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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As stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938): 
The determination of whether there has been an in-
telligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend 
in each case, upon the particular facts and circum-
stances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused. 
See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), 
and Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), which 
seem to establish the federal standard as to waiver 
of right to counsel as being a waiver that has been 
intelligently and understandingly effected by the 
accused. 
This court, in State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 16, 
361 P.2d 509, 510, follows the federal standard. It is 
therein stated: 
The determining factor of whether appellant was con-
victed without due process of law is whether there 
has been an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 
In determining whether appellant intelligently 
and understandingly waived his right to counsel, it 
is proper to consider the appellant's background, 
experience and conduct. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 
and State v. Spiers, supra. Appellant testified that he 
had previously served a term in the Utah State 
Prison commencing around 1956 (R. 34). As to that 
charge, appellant admitted that he at first pleaded 
guilty (R. 34), but that when he was bound over to 
the district court, the matter was referred back to the 
city court for the appointment of counsel (R. 35). Ap-
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pellant was, therefore, keenly aware of his right to 
counsel. 
It is proper to consider the past criminal record 
of an accused in determining whether the accused 
intelligently and understandingly waived his right 
to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst. supra; Verdon v. United 
States, 296 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1961); Michener v. 
United States, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950); Lesieau v. 
United States. 177 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1949). 
It is also vital to recognize that, because of ap-
pellant's past experience, he was admittedly aware 
of the penalty for the crime for second degree burg-
lary (R. 40) and also the likelihood that he would be 
returned to the Utah State Prison (R. 41). 
During cross-examination, the - following tran-
spired: (R. 38): 
Q. Let me ask you. referring to Exhibit P-1. 
which appears to be a certified transcript by 
Dale J. Johnson. official court reporter. Fourth 
Judicial Court. and ask you if this in fact 
occurred: 
The Court: Come forward. Is your name James 
Floyd Workman? 
Mr. Workman: Yes. 
The Court: How old are you? 
Mr. Workman: Twenty five. 
The Court: You are before the court at this time to 
answer to a charge which has been brought by the 
District Attorney of the Fourth Judicial District, 
State of Utah. Are you represented by an attorney? 
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Mr. Workman: No. 
The Court: Do you want an attorney? 
Mr. Workman: No. 
The Court: You are advised that you have a right to 
have an attorney if you want one. If you are unable 
to employ one yourself, the court will appoint one 
for you. Do you want one? 
Mr. Workman: No. 
The appellant testified that, while he didn't re-
call that the above proceedings occurring, they 
could have in fact occurred (R. 39). 
Therefore, it cannot be said that after a proper 
inquiry by the court, the appellant did not inteHi-
gently and understandingly waive his right to coun-
sel. Rather, the exact opposite is established by the 
record and also by appellant's background, con-
duct, and experience. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ADVISE THE 
APPELLANT OF POSSIBLE INCARCERATION AT THE 
'I'IME APPELLANT ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY 
DOES NOT AFFORD A BASIS FOR RELIEF BY WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND SUCH FAILURE DID NOT 
RESULT IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO THE APPEL-
LANT. 
In State v. Banford, 13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 
(1962), collateral relief was sought because of the 
trial court's failure to advise the accused of the con-
sequences of a plea of guilty. It is submitted that 
habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal. In 
Thompson v. Harris. 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91 (1944), 
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this court indicated that habeas corpus is much nar-
rower in scope than direct appeal and is limited to 
those instances where there has been a substantial 
departure from due process. This court stated, 107 
Utah at 102, 152 P.2d at 94: 
The writ of habeas corpus must not be used to dis-
cover and correct all errors which might creep into a 
criminal trial. The time for taking an appeal has 
wisely been limited by law. If the writ of habeas 
corpus were to be used to reach all defects in the trial 
which could be raised by a timely appeal, no convic-
tion could become final. We recognize that some 
errors are more prejudicial to a defendant than are 
others, but if habeas corpus is to be used to correct 
error, where can we draw the line? Should we leave 
the determination as to when there has been and has 
not been sufficient error to warrant interference by 
the use of a writ of habeas corpus entirely to the 
discretion of each judge based on standards which 
he may invoke from his own mind? We believe that 
the only sound line that can be-drawn is to restrict 
the use of the writ of habeas corpus to the correction 
of jurisdictional errors and to errors so gross as to 
in effect deprive the defendant of his constitutional 
substantive or procedural rights. Anything short of 
that must be corrected on appeal or by the board of 
pardons. And this of course is true whether the con-
stitutional right is granted by the state constitution 
or by the federal constitution through the absorpion 
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Recently in Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 273, 
400 P.2d 386 (1965), this court again acknowledged 
the application of the principle in the Thompson 
case. This court further stated in reference to the 
validity of judgments, 17 Utah 2d at 275, 400 P.2d at 
388: 
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It is then not subject to attack under habeas corpus 
or any other collateral proceeding except in the most 
unusual circumstances: where the court was without 
jurisdiction; or there has been a substantial failure 
to accord the accused due process of law; or perhaps 
for example where it is indisputably shown that here 
is a mistaken identity; or that there has been a know-
ing and wilful falsification of the evidence by the 
prosecutor; or some other such circumstance that it 
would be wholly unconscionable not to reexamine the 
conviction. 
Consequently, it is submitted that there is no 
basis for habeas corpus because of a technical fail-
ure to intensively advise the defendant pleading 
guilty as to all the consequences of his plea unless 
it is apparent that there was substantial likelihood, 
from what actually occurred, that the defendant 
would not have understood the consequences of 
his plea or his rights would have been otherwise 
inadequately protected. In the instant case, the rec-
ord unquestionably shows the appellant, because 
of his past experience, realized the penalty of sec-
ond degree burglary (R. 40) and also the likelihood 
that he would be returned to the Utah State Prison 
(R. 41). 
It is, therefore, submitted that because of the 
nature of the proceedings in habeas corpus and also 
because of the undisputed facts in the instant case, 
the failure of the court to advise appellant of the pos-
sible consequences of a plea of guilty is not a proper 
basis for habeas corpus and no prejudicial error re-
sulted to the appellant. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT AT THE 
TIME OF HIS ARREST HE WAS NOT ADEQUATELY 
APPRAISED OF HIS RIGHTS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND FURTHER, EVEN IN THE AB-
SENCE OF SUCH AN APPRAISAL, THERE WOULD 
NOT BE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
At the hearing, the state introduced the testi-
mony of Kenneth Forshee, a lieutenant in the Provo 
City Police Department and also the arresting offi-
cer, to establish that subsequent to appellant's ar-
rest, appellant voluntarily gave a statement implicat-
ing himself and confessing his guilt as to the charge 
of second degree burglary (R. 49-61). The statements 
were introduced into evidence as Exhibits D-2 and 
D-3 and specifically state, "I have been advised that 
I have the right to an attorney and th9-t this statement 
may be used for or against me in any court or trial 
I might stand." The validity of the statements is 
borne out by the testimony of the officer. 
However, it is also submitted that the reference 
by the appellant to Miranda v. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
694 (1966), is not appropriate inasmuch as the stan-
dards established by that decision are not to be 
retroactively applied to proceedings that transpired 
in 1962. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in the instant case clearly supports 
the findings of fact and conclusion of law made by 
the trial court. The appellant indisputably, intelli-
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0ently, and understandingly waived his right to 
counsel throughout all stages of the proceedings 
that resulted in his commitment. The fact that the 
district court did not advise appellant of the possible 
consequences of his plea of guilty are not properly 
subject to review by writ of habeas corpus and also, 
because of the appellant's background and past ex-
perience, such advice was unnecessary because it 
would simply have been repeating what the appel-
lant was admittedly aware of. The record does not 
support appellant's contention that he was not ap-
praised of his rights at the time of his arrest, but even 
if this was the established case, there was no revers-
ible error committed because the standards estab-
lished by the United Supreme Court in the 
case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, are not to be 
retroactively applied to procedures culminated in 
1962. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Asst. Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
